A VIEW FROM THE LANDER:
THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN FEDERALISM IN HISTORICAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A Thesis· -_ Presented to
the Faculty of the Institute for Regional Analysis and Public Policy
Morehead State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Public Administration

by
Erik Weber
April 24, 2009

Accepted by the facu lty of the Institute for Regional Anal ysis and Public Policy,
Morehead State Univers ity, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master of Public Admin istration degree.

Date

A VIEW FROM 1HE LANDER:
1HE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN FEDERALISM IN A 1-IlSTORICALAND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Erik S. Weber, M.P.A.
Morehead State University, 2009

Director of Thesis:

_;a
__

+~"""---'----1,'---W
__._C€.f..,.'--='-J},_~~..:,j--/-4

Though it has foundations in many of the same political theoretical writings, German

foderalismus has never quite meant the same thing nor functioned in the same way as
American federalism. As a result, the German political system has generally been
much more unitary than its American counterpart despite both being termed
federations. This was especially true in the post-war reconstructed German Federal
Republic. Unlike the American system at the same time, the German Federation
remained mostly unchanged throughout the 50s, 60s, and 70s. With the fall of the
Berlin Wall in I 989 and the subsequent German reunification, though, the country's
federal system has been placed under a variety of stresses, which have exacted a toll
on the classical German unitary federalism. This thesis seeks to examine the
historical evolution of federalism in the German nation, concentrating primarily on
the time from the formation of the Federal German Republic through reunification
and into pres~nt day. This assessment will concentrate on the tangible effects of

institutional reform (and sometimes non-reform) on federal intergovernmental
relations, especially from the perspective of the Lander, or states. Several recent
attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, at constitutional reform will be
considered in light of public policy formulation models especially the multiple
streams frameworks. Along the way, comparisons will be drawn to America's own
federal system and its evolution through the history of the United States. Assessing
these similarities and differences, the thesis closes by drawing some conclusions as to
the current state and future direction of the German federal system as we near the
twentieth anniversary ofreunification. German federalism, it seems, has been a
pragmatic outcome of cultural and historical regionalism applied to political realities
throughout history. Evolutions in the German federal design have come on the heels
of enormous institutional changes as a result of wars or major regime changes. This
did not happen following the German reunification, which has resulted in a stagnation
of federal evolution which poses major challenges to the Federal German Republic as
it celebrates sixty years of existence.
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Introduction
Germany has a long and varied history. Both the American term federalism
and its German counterpart Foderalismus are derived from the Latin wordfoedus,
meaning alliance or contract.' Despite shared etymology, and even though it has
foundations in many of the same political theoretical writings, Germanfoderalismus
has never quite meant the same thing as American federalism. As a result, the
German political system has generally been considered much more unitary than its
American counterpart despite both governments being termed federations. This
unitary character of the German system was especially true in the post-war
reconstructed German Federal Republic. Unlike the American system at the same
time, the German Federation remained mostly unchanged throughout the 1950s, 60s,
and 70s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent German
reunification, though, the country's federal system has been placed under a variety of
stresses, which have exacted a toll on the preconditions which helped form German
unitary federalism in the first place. The result has been an increasing call for reform
of the federal system of intergovernmental relations, with some, albeit limited and
incremental, success.
This thesis seeks to understand the evolution of federalism throughout
German history, with a particular emphasis on the past half century. Following a brief
Deutscher Bundesrat, "Federalism" [Web site] (Berlin: Deutscher Bundesrat); available from
<http://www.bundesrat.de/nn_ 11004/EN/funktionen-en/inhalte/1-Foederalismus-en.html>;
accessed 7 April 2009.
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introduction of the German political system, I will undertake a historical review of
development ofGermanfoderalismus, culminating in an assessment of recent reforms
(or attempted reforms, as the case may be) within several major public policy and
intergovernmental frameworks, offering finally a prognosis for the future of federal
reform as Germany moves further into a federalized Europe. Throughout the thesis,
where relevant, comparisons will be drawn to similar and contrasting theories and
events in the American federal experience.

The German Political System
To gain an understanding of the complex German federal system and make
any meaningful comparisons of German and American intergovernmental relations, it
is first important to have at least a rudimentary understanding of the most important
German political institutions, especially vis-a-vis their American counterparts.
Germany's government is characterized as a federal parliamentary republican
form of government. The Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and, or Federal Republic of
Germany embodies many of the same Montesquieuian ideas of the separation of
powers that are seen in the American government, with both horizontal and vertical
separation of governing powers. At the federal or Bund level power is divided, much
like in the U.S., between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government. The executive branch consists of the Bundesprasident, or Federal
President, who is the primarily ceremonial head of state, elected every five years by
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the Federal Assembly made up of the Bundestag and state delegates representing the
legislatures of the various Lander. The head of government and chief executive is the
Bundeskanzler (or in the current case of Angela Merkel, the Bundeskanzlerin) or

Federal Chancellor and is chosen by Bundestag from among its elected members,
much like the prime minister of England.
As a parliamentary system, the German legislative branch is made up of two
houses, the Bundestag, or Federal Diet, and the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, which
are elected differently and provide different representation than the American houses
of Congress. While Bundestag is considered a parliament, the method of electing its
deputies is classified as a mixed member proportional representation system,
attempting to combine the benefits of the straightforward proportional representation
system with the those of a first-past-the-post, district-based representation system like
in the United States. Approximately half of the deputies are elected by and represent
a specific district. Separately, all political parties which receive more than five
percent of the national vote are entitled to seat deputies in the Bundestag. After the
single-seat constituencies are elected, parties are assigned_ a number of open seats so
that when added to the constituency seats wqn in district elections, the total number
of seats each party has matches the proportion of the national vote they received.
2 There are 299 single-seat constituencies which ideally make up half of the Bundestag's minimum
498 seats. Because some parties may win more single-seat constituencies than their proportion of
the national vote would dictate though, "overhang seats" may be allocated. These parties are
allowed to keep those constituency seats but an equal number of open seats are distributed among
the parties garnering the minimum five percent so that 498 seats are distributed proportionally
among these parties.
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These seats are filled from a party list of candidates, some of whom may also have
been elected to their local constituency seat, in which case the party is able to appoint
deputies further down their list. This mixed member system allows citizens to cast
two votes in national elections, one for a specific candidate in their constituency and
one for a national party.
The judicial branch of the federal government is composed of a number of
different courts housed around the country, the two most of important of which are
based in Karlsruhe. The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), or Federal Court of Justice, is the
highest court in the country for civil and criminal jurisdiction. Decisions of the

Bundesgerichtshofcan only be overturned by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerjG),
or Federal Constitutional Court, which has the ultimate ability to rule on issues of
constitutionality.' Though the lower BGH assumes some responsibilities of court of
last resort that might in the US be associated with the Supreme Court, with the respect
to constitutional issues, the BVerfG is the primary parallel institution to the United
States Supreme Court. The Bundesverfassungsgericht is composed of sixteen judges
sitting in two separate eight-judge Senates. Much like in the Supreme Court, whether
a case raises a legitimate constitutional question to be heard by the court can be
decided by smaller three-judge panels or en bane. The judges of the Constitutional
Court are not appointed to life terms, like American Supreme Court justices, but

3 "The Federal Court of Justice," [Web site] (Bundesgerichtshof, July 2008); available from
<http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/docs/brochurebgh_2008.pdt>; accessed 12 April 2009.
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rather are elected, half by the Bundestag, half by the Bundesrat, in a process rather
similar to the American justices' congressional confirmation, to single, twelve-year
terms. 4
While the division of powers at the Bund level play some part in the
operations of the federal system, what truly characterizes German federalism is the
division (and sharing) of powers across the vertical levels of government and how
they affect a complex system of intergovernmental relations. The Bundesrepub/ik

Deutsch/and consists of at 16 Bundeslander (Lander for short) or federal states.
Thirteen of these are characterized as Flaechenlander, or area states, in contrast to the
three Stadtstaaten, or city states, of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. The states vary
widely in population, size, density and geography. Each of the Lander possesses a
popularly elected diet from which the Ministerprasident, the state minister president
or prime minister, is chosen.

The Centrality of the Bundesrat
The Bundesrat, or Federal Council, often colloquially referred to as the

Landerkammer (states chamber) is not an upper legislative house in the sense of the
United States Senate or even the House of Lords in England. 5 Rather, it is a sort of
second chamber which represents the Lander in the federal government, which merits
4 "The Bundesverfassungsgericht- Organization," [Web site] (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2009);
available from <http://www.bverfg.de/en/organization/organization.html>; accessed 12 April 2009.
5 Arthur Gunlicks, "German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts," German Law Journal 06
(2005): 1284, note I.
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special attention in this thesis precisely because it plays a central role in
intergovernmental relations landscape of German politics. As opposed to the US
Senate in which the states are indirectly represented by senators who are directly
elected by the citizens of their respective states, the Bundesrat is actually composed
of members of the state governments. Even before the passing of the Seventeenth
Amendment to the Constitution, American Senators were chosen by state legislatures
to represent them in Washington, whereas, in Germany, the state executive is
represented in the Bundesrat: only the minister presidents and other state ministers
may be seated in the Federal Council. Furthermore, the Bundesrat does not afford
each Land equal representation as the Senate does states, instead assigning each Land
three to six votes, depending on population. A state must cast its votes en bloc
requiring state governing coalitions either to find a suitable compromise or abstain
from the voting. 6 The unique position of the Bundesrat as a federal organ of the
Lander cabinets places it inextricably in the center of any discussion about German
federal and intergovernmental relations.

The History of German Federalism
Amongst the various peculiarities which distinguish the Germanic
Empire, in its political constitution, from all other nations of Europe,
one of the first is its being composed of several states, which when we
consider the difference of their situation, their extent, internal
6 "Bundesrat-Bundesrat members" [Web site] (Bundesrat, 2009); available from
<http://www.bundesrat.de/nn_ 11006/EN/organisation-en/mitgl ieder-en/mitglieder-en-inhalt.htm I>;
accessed 12 April 2009.
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regulations and condition in general, seem to have no relation to each
other, at least in no other respect than other European nations; yet,
notwithstanding this, together they always form an entire body, subject
to a common head, under one superior power. The origin of this very
singular constitution may be traced in the most ancient history; for in the
earliest ages Germany was inhabited by a variety of nations, which,
although sprung from the same origin, as several tribes from on
principal people, had each of them their own regulations, and enjoyed
the most perfect liberty and independence. 7
The unique history of the German nation" meant that what would become
known as federalism had been occurring to varying degrees throughout the Holy
Roman Empire. Unlike in America, there is no focussing event which could be
described as precipitating the genesis of German federalism. To that extent, as well,
the political discourse that would begin in the eighteenth century in Germany, had a
much more concrete foundation than the American debates which were positing what
was, to the founding fathers, primarily a theoretical political form. Germany, on the
other hand, had the quasi-federal experiences of the Hanseatic states, the Holy Roman
Empire, and the Wilhelmine Era, among others, to look upon. To further analyze the
current challenges facing German federalism, this thesis seeks first to understand the
historical evolution of a system that has its origins in regional politics dating back
more than a millennium.
German political and legal writer Johann Stephan Piitter posited, in his
seminal work investigating the development of German political organization, that the
7 Johann Stephan PUiier, An Historical Development of the Present Political Constitution of the
Germanic Empire, trans. Josiah Domford (London: T. Payne and Son, 1790), 1-2.
8 Nation is used here in the cultural sense, as opposed to the political term 'state' with which nation is
often confused in popular discourse.
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origins of the peculiar decentralized political organization of Germany in the late
eighteenth century could be traced far back into the late pre-modern history of the
Germanic tribes. He recounts numerous ancient Roman historical documents which
make reference to more than fifty Germanic nations, some of which have maintained
German names derived from the old Latin, among them Riigen (from the Latin name

Rugi) and Friesland (from the Latin Frisii). 9 Piitter further described how the early
Germanic nations united during times of war under one or another leader only to
return to their respective independent affairs at the conclusion of the war. ID
The evolution of the German regional identities continued from the beginning
of the Holy Roman empire, at which point already several of the modern-day Lander
were taking shape. Although not all geographically recognizable, the various political
states of Saxony, Thuringia, and Bavaria were well established by the turn of the
millennium. 11 Four-hundred years later, Wiirttemberg, Hessen, Brandenburg and
Mecklenburg had joined as recognized princedoms, duchies, or earldoms. 12 By 1664,
the Holy Roman Empire had been organized into a federation of states in which the
federation had clear a clear mandate to protect and maintain law, defense, and peace
across the territories. 13 It seems the various states had sacrificed some of their
9 Piltter, An Historical Development of the Present Political Constitution of the Germanic Empire, 2.
10 Ibid, 9.
11 "Deutschland um das Jahr I 000" in Prof G. Droysens Allgemeiner Historitscher Handatlas, ed.
Richard Andree (Bielefeld: Velhagen & Klasing, 1886) [Atlas online] available from
<http://www.maproom.org/00/08/present.php?m=0022>; accessed 20 April 2009.
12 "Deutschland im XV. Jahrhundert" Ibid. [Atlas] available from
<http://www.maproom.org/00/08/present.php?m=0034>; accessed 20 April 2009.
13 Joachim Whaley, "federal Habits: the Holy Roman Empire and the Continuity of German
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sovereignty to a larger political entity which could better protect them from the
political realities of existing in the center of a Europe dominated by warring empires.
In other words, the Holy Roman Empire was a political union which served practical
purposes while allowing its member states to maintain their identities.
Umbach argues that the development of "federalism as a political category" in
Germany began around the same time the political discourse was picking up in the
American colonies. The historical emphasis on polycentric power structures,
especially in the Holy Roman Empire provided the setting for this debate. The Holy
Roman Empire, Joachim Whaley argues, was not weak and dysfunctional as
maintained by mid-twentieth-century German historians, but rather quite adept at
fulfilling its goal, maintaining peace and preventing despotism in the German
nation. 14 Umbach writes, "[T]he Old Reich was in many ways a federal state - but it
was not (yet) defined as such." 15 It was clear there was a history of federal-style
political organization within the German nation which informed the enlightenmentera political discourse. In response to the political developments of the day, Umbach
continues, German political writers in the late 1700s, like Piitter, began to reassess the
regional, polycentric German political history through the Jens of new intellectual
ideas about political organization and devolution. This process has proven influential
on most periods of German politics since then, providing well documented precedents
Federalism," in German Federalism, ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 18.
14 Ibid, 18-19.
15 Umbach, Maiken. "Introduction: German Federalism in Historical Perspective," in German
Federalism, ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 3.
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for smaller states and eventually Lander to invoke when fighting for regional
autonomy. 16
To this extent, German federal history has produced a certain continuity, albeit
not in any sense of continuous federal structure. Rather, German federal experiences
have implanted a sort of political continuity, and pride, in the national memory, in
which the periods of "federalism" seem to be the focal points. Maiken Umbach
writes,
German Foderalismus is not, and never has been, an abstract concept. It
has no single founding document and no universal definition·. Its
meaning evolved gradually, over many centuries .... [H]istory itself
plays a central role in defining federalism in German minds. Indeed,
federalism has become, for many, the central embodiment of the
country's history, or at least of its positive (that is, anti-totalitarian)
aspects. 17
Federalism was not formalized in the annals of German political history, instead it
occupied a place in the German psyche, a sort of political bewusstsein or
consciousness. Obviously there have been German regimes that lacked anything but
a fleeting resemblance to a federal structure, but this national memory of the "glory
days" of federal states has always, it seems, played a role in reconstructing
democratic regimes at appropriate points in history. 18
In 1871, Otto von Bismark's incorporation of the German Empire as a
federation of free-states, kingdoms, and other sovereign entities solidified federalism
16 Umbach, "Introduction," 4.
17/bid.,2.
18 Ibid., 4-5.
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as a "mainstay of Germany's political and constitutional order."" Even at this point
though, the adoption of federalism had less to do with a historical tradition of its
application and more to do with the political power structures and realities which
became apparent in the unification efforts of the previous decade. 20 Once again,
federalism was adopted out of political pragmatism rather than ideological
preference.

The Implications of "F.ederal" History and Historical Regionalism
Federalism, in the German experience, has been built around the historical
regionalism and the variety of cultural identities that come with the regions.
Historical experiments in federal structure have accommodated both a regional and
national identity, and, for the most part without hierarchy,' 1 in contrast to the
American colonial experience where, leading up to the Revolutionary war, colonists
often considered themselves Virginians or New Yorkers first and Americans second.
Still, the dual German identities resemble the subsequent development in the new
American federal system of a concept of dual citizenship under which people
consider themselves citizens of a state and the nation simultaneously.
Continuing the investigation of German regional identity, Umbach discusses
the dichotomy of American sociologist Theda Skocpol, created for cultural analysis in

19 Alon Contino, "Federalism and the Heimat Idea in Imperial Germany," in German Federalism, ed.
Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 70.
20 Ibid, 72.
21 Umbach, "Introduction," 5.
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the social and political sciences. She posits two separate categories: "cultural idioms"
and "political ideologies." German regional identities, both historic and modern-day,
are cultural idioms in Skocpol's taxonomy. Bavarian, Swabian, Prussian, or Saxon
identities, to name a few, have played, and continue to play a major role in the
evolving saga of German federalism. Even the German language can be seen in a
federal sense: each region or Land had its own dialect, while Hoch Deutsch or High
German was the formalized, region-neutral language understood across the German
nation. 22 Germany experienced a revival of regionalism in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries that was rather peculiar within the rest of Europe, and yet,
regionalism cannot alone explain the political proclivity for federalism. France
experienced a similar regional resurgence in the nineteenth century, yet the French
state continues to be one of the most unitary in Europe. Thus, we can conclude that
the German regional identities have played a necessary, but not sufficient role in the
development of German federalism. Returning to Skocpol's dichotomy, there must be
also an element of political ideology which influenced federalism in Germany. At
various points in German history when a new state was being built, political discourse
tended to be very historically minded, and so the cultural idiom of historical
regionalism actually informed political ideologies: the importance of regional
identities coalesced with the political realities of the day, under which a unitary state
may have been impossible to form.
22 Umbach, "Introduction," 6.
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Historians have, at a various times, pointed out that German federalism lacks a
concrete definition or foundational document to which it is tied. Umbach and her
colleagues argue that the lack of specificity associated with the term federalism was,
contrary to popular belief, a primary reason for the success of federalism as a guiding
principle in German politics. Rather than be restricted by a formalized document or
definition, federalism in the German experience has been molded and formed to fit
practical needs of various chapters in history. 23 As mentioned above, the German
historical regionalism was expressed in practical form through the federal structures,
and especially in light of pertinent contemporary political conditions. We can see this
manifested in the decision of Bismark to unify Germany in 1871 under a federal
structure, of the western Allies to combine their occupational zones into a federal
republic following World War II, and of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to reunify the
eleven Lander of West Germany with the six Lander of East Germany, rather than to
combine two countries. 24 These sorts of occurrences, what may be termed "pragmatic
federalism," seem to constitute a recurring theme in the development of German
federalism, and are highlighted throughout this thesis. Even during the Nazi regime,
although federalism was decried as dividing the single German people, and formally
abolished, it remained in practice throughout the Third Reich. It continued to serve a
practical purpose in the dynamics of institutional competition as and a rhetorical

23 Umbach, "Introduction," 5.
24 Ibid, 7.
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purpose in the Nazi promotion of Stammesbewusstsein. Again, regionalism holds a
special place in the cultural idioms of Germans, but the political system of federalism
is still for the most part a practical manifestation. There is no historical attachment to
or national pride associated with federalism as much as federalism embodies or at
least allows Germans to maintain their regional identities while defending against
authoritarian politics which have plagued the German nation on several occasions
through their history.
Furthermore, in a comparative sense, an argument can be made that the
German lack of definitional specificity is not so unlike the American experience.
Especially during the American founding, the definition of federalism was so inexact
that, by the drafting of the Constitution, the term "Federalist" was applied to those
statesmen who argued for a stronger centralization of powers in the national
government while "Anti-Federalists" were those who called for a weaker central
government with considerable sovereignty reserved to the states. 25 Moreover, the
principal documents of American government say very little about federalism. The
Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers published around the time of the Constitutional
Convention debated at great lengths the virtues and downfalls of federalism in theory,
but while many of the concepts debated were subsequently incorporated in the
Constitution, none of the words 'federal', 'federalism', or 'federation' appear anywhere

25 Martin Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock
Publishers, Inc., 1981 ), 25.
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in the final document.
This observation draws a stark contrast to the German Grundgesetz, the
official English translation of which contains the word 'federation' an incredible 164
times. This is the manifestation of the difference in the American and German ideas
of federalism which were promulgated from the beginning of this thesis. American
federalism is an abstract idea which informs the design of the political system. Its
ideals existed outside of a particular political regime, in the political writings and
discourse of various intellectuals, and thus needed not be, or perhaps even could not
be enumerated in the Constitution. German federalism, on the contrary, is, and
always has been, almost entirely one and the same with the contemporary political
system, thus the omnipresence of related terms in the much lengthier Grundgesetz.

Modern-day German and the Adoption of Cooperative Federalism
Immediately following Germany's surrender in 1945, regionalism once again
found its way into the political organization of the country, beginning on a crude level
with the division of Germany into four occupational zones of the Allied Powers.
Even before the incorporation of the two post-war German sovereign states, Lander
were established as political actors in the rebuilding process 26 . While some of these
were modern-day constructions, many of the new Lander approximated historical
kingdoms, princedoms and states such as Bavaria, Baden, Hanover, Saxony and
26 Roland Stunn, "The Federal System: Breaking through the Barriers of Interlocking Federalism?" in
Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany, ed. Ludger Helms (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), I 06.
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Prussia, som~ even maintaining the historical names. Thus historical regionalism was
once again reborn. Though abolished less than three years after the formal
incorporation of the German Democratic Republic, the five Lander which would

'

make up the GDR had already played important roles in the years immediately
following the end of World War II, holding elections and sending representatives first
to the people's congress which would officially establish the GDR and draft its
constitution, and sitting in the Landerkammer, or States Chamber until their
dissolution into 14 Bezirke in 1952. 27 Certainly unbeknownst to anyone at the time,
this short period ofregional activism would play an important role in the reunification
efforts nearly 40 years later.
In establishing a sovereign state from their combined occupation zones, the
Western allies quickly decided on a federal government structure. This was
influenced in part by quickly growing influence of political parties in post-war
occupied Germany. As mentioned, following German surrender and with the advent
of allied occupation, German Lander reemerged as political entities with burgeoning
party organizations.
Within the occupied Lander, political parties would come to play a vital role
in the formation of a new German democratic state. Vestiges of the pre-war political
parties were quickly revived within these new states: the Sozial Demokratische Partei

27 Mary Fulbrook, "Democratic Centralism and Regionalism in the GDR," in German Federalism, ed.
Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 147.
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(SPD) or Social Democratic Party, one of the oldest political parties in Europe, and
the Christlieb Demokratische Union (CDU) or Christian Democratic Union, an
agglomeration of pre-war center-right parties established in 1945 as an anti-Nazi
party with Christian underpinnings. Parties were licensed by the Allied powers as
long as their organizers had no former ties to the Nazi regime. Though working
under the guidance of the occupying powers, the new parties would become the
primary architects of the new Federal Republic. With the founding three years later
of the Freie Demokratische Partei, or Free Democrats, the specter of Weimar
Republic multi-party factionalism was raised, prompting the framers to contemplate
ways to avoid the genesis of numerous small, weak, only marginally differentiated
parties which had led to the Nazi rise of power in the 1930s. Rather than to exclude
parties altogether from the primary law-making and administrative functions of
government, the German framers did the opposite, incorporating political parties
directly in to the new Grundgesetz or Basic Law as the primary representative organs
of the people, not only during elections, but in the day-to-day operations of the
Government. As will continue to be seen over the course of the following halfcentury, it is doubtful that these decisions were made without at least a tinge of selfinterest on the part of the aspiring party leaders of the late 1940s. They sought to
secure political power and relevance for themselves in the future of the Federal
Republic. And so political parties were incorporated as an essential institution in the
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German republic under Article 21 of the Grundgesetz which states that the parties are
responsible for "forming the political will of the people.""
This development in post-war Germany must be seen in stark contrast to the
establishment of the United States, and the Constitutional Convention. The American
framers were extremely wary of political parties: James Madison wrote in Federalist

No. IO about the virtues of a large union with a relatively strong federal government
as a protection against the dangers offaction. 29 George Washington, the country's
first president, in his 1796 farewell address, railed against the devastating
factionalism which he believed would come with the establishment of formal political
parties. 30 Obviously, we must also acknowledge that, by the late 1940s, when
Germany's new government was being contemplated, virtually all democratic
governments, as weII as many non-democratic ones, possessed some sort of party
system, but the extent to which the parties were directly incorporated into the political
system in Germany was relatively unique, especially vis-a-vis the extra-constitutional
existence of the American parties.
Having agreed upon the form of government, the German framers moved to
consider the basic tenets of the new government. Scholars seem to agree that the
28 Gregg 0. Kvistad, "Parteienverdrossenheit? Whither the Gennan Party-State in the 1990s?" in The
Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty, ed. Peter H. Merkl (New York: New York University Press,
1999), 175.
29 James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," in The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York:
Penguin Putnam Inc., 1961), 45-47.
30 George Washington, "Farewell Address," [Web site and database] (Yale University: The Avalon
Project, 2008); available from <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l 8th_century/washing.asp>; accessed I 9
April 2009.
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fundamental goal sought in the post-war government was the provision of common
standards of living and uniform policy delivery across the federal territory. The point
cannot be over-emphasized for the importance it would come to play in the
development of the federal system over the following decades. Furthermore, in this
respect, Charlie Jeffery argues, German federalism differed from most other federal
systems, which were conceived first and foremost to promote and guarantee territorial
diversity not uniformity. 31
Though debatable, this thesis takes the position that, like German federalism
according to Jeffery's argument, American federalism, too, was not conceived as "a
guarantor for territorial diversity." Americans had just dealt with a half-century of
increasingly despotic unrepresentative monarchy so its political and intellectual
leaders sought a system which they believed would prevent such an occurrence within
a republican government (the rule of King George had been more of an external
imposition of tyranny). Following the lengthy theoretical debates of the framers, it
seemed that federalism was just that system. If it maintained or guaranteed territorial
diversity, that was only a convenient secondary consequence of a system which first
and foremost protected the rights of its citizens from despotism. Additionally,

31 Charlie Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," in German Federalism,
ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 172-173.
For Switzerland, generally accepted as the first nation after the United States to adopt a true a federal
form of government in 1848, and Canada, which followed suit 1867, the argument for federalism as a
"guarantor for territorial diversity" is readily apparent. The Swiss Federation incorporates 4 different
geographically divided ethnic groups, and Canada, too, housed both anglophone and francophone
cultures.
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America in the 1780s was relatively devoid of territorial or cultural diversity to
protect. Early French, Dutch, and other continental European settlers had been
thoroughly Anglicized since England took control of the American colonies. To be
sure, if there was significant territorial diversity to be guaranteed in postRevolutionary War America, it had certainly been overlooked by John Jay who
remarked in Federalist No. 2, "I have ... often taken notice that Providence has been
pleased to give this one connected country to one united people---a people descended
from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion,
[and] ... very similar in their manners and customs .... " 32 In fact, one could argue that
Germany in 1871 and 1949 had more territorial diversity than newly independent
America, given the north-south religious cleavage between Protestants and Catholics
as well as, in 1871 at least, significant Jewish populations in the north east areas of
Prussia, Silesia, Posen, and other parts of modem-day Poland and Czech Republic.
Again, Jeffery points out that despite the these territorial differences which
federalism in other countries had been employed to foster and protect, federalism was
to be employed in Germany to establish uniformity of conditions. 33 To explain this
irony, we should return to the dichotomy of Theda Skocpol discussed earlier. We
have established that the historical regionalism and associated identities are cultural
idioms in Skocpol's schematic, while the political ideology the framers were seeking
32 John Jay, "Federalist No. 2," in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin
Putnam Inc., 1961), 6.
33 Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperatio~ to Competition," 172-173.
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to establish was one of uniformity and consensus. Once again, federalism, now more
unitary than in the past, seemed to be the most pragmatic way to reconcile regional
identities (as opposed to territorial diversity) with uniform policy provision.
Furthermore, with careful design, the political parties, and sovereignty, although
limited, of the Lander, it was believed, would help prevent the authoritarian
centralization of power in the future. 34 This second point even became somewhat of a
public relations assertion for the Federal Republic to allay the fears of its European
neighbors that a newly independent German country would, once again, pose a threat
to their sovereignty.
Under the newly established Federal Republic of Germany and the

Grundgesetz, the federal government would be responsible for most policy making,
leaving the administration up to the individual Lander. Still, even policy making at
the federal level required the involvement and consent of the Lander via the

Bundesrat. According to the Parliamentary Council deliberations, the bills requiring
consent of the Lander was initially intended to be limited to 30 percent. It quickly
became apparent that this had been a gross miscalculation. The Bundesrat had the
constitutional power to veto any legislation which directly affected the Lander. As
European integration increased in the second half of the twentieth century, the
number of regulations promulgated by the Bund which impacted the Lander began to
34 Charlie Jeffery, "Federalism: The New Territorialism," in Governance in contemporary Germany:
the semisovereign state revisited, eds. Simon Green and William E. Paterson (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78.
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increase manyfold.
Even in policy areas, such as education, where they were not dictated by the

Bund, the Lander were, from the early days, coordinating their policies to ensure
uniformity. These coordination efforts gave rise to so-called "subject matter
brotherhoods" 35 in which the federal and Land ministers met to coordinate policies
that they would take back to their respective cabinets and legislatures. So it is clear
that the establishment of a highly coordinated and cooperative system of

politikverjlechtung, in English entanglement or interconnection, was not merely some
authoritarian antidote accepted begrudgingly by the Lander, but rather a system which
they very willingly helped solidify. 36 The political party apparatus must also be given
its due in this process: because the Land party organization in the first several decades
of the Bundesrepublik exercised little independence from their national bureaus, the
coordination of national party lines and policy further ossified the

politikverjlechtung. 37
Proponents of this system argue that a kooperativer Foderalismus, or
cooperative federalism, is the only logical system with which to facilitate the ultimate
goal of consensus-seeking and policy uniformity. The unitary nature of the
cooperative federal design was accepted precisely because the post-war German
populous valued the goal of uniformity of social welfare and living conditions above
35 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism and Recent Refonn Efforts," 1292.
36 Jeffery, "Federalism: the New Territorialism," 81.
37 Stunn, "The Federal System," 109.
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the protection ofregional political interests or independence.

Moving from Cooperative to Competitive Federalism
The pursuit of common standards has become a highly contested goal.
The implications of even trying to work collectively towards uniformity
are increasingly unwelcome for many of the Lander.... The notion of
collective action through cooperative structures to secure common goals
now implies for any one Land a much greater degree of compromise of
its political interests than it did in the West German past. 38
Reunification of Germany drastically altered the political, social, cultural and,
above all, economic landscape of the country in a very short period of time. It is
difficult to imagine a similar set of strains which have been placed on the American
system in such a short time. The closest comparison may be the onset of the Great
Depression. This raises an interesting comparative question considering that the
Great Depression precipitated perhaps the greatest short-term reform/evolution in
American history. Beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing
proposal, the United States Supreme Court began to abandon a strict, dual federalism
interpretation of the Constitution, allowing the federal government to assume broader
powers to combat poverty and other social problems which were exacerbated by the
depression. While it is both interesting and ironic to note that the U.S. sought to
centralize its federalism under the strains of the 1930s, and Germany sought quite the
opposite during its troubles in the early 1990s, the point remains that broad systemic
stresses have historically led to attempts at reform - some successful, some not.
38 Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," I 73.
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Why has the classic politikverflechtung of German cooperative federalism
fallen so out of grace? Several political commentators, including Charlie Jeffery"
and Roland Sturm, 40 argue that with the changing political and economic landscape,
the preconditions which led to the original adoption and subsequent strengthening of
the cooperative federal system have, one by one, disappeared. The specifics of these
preconditions vary from scholar to scholar, but several overarching themes are clear.
First, in the post-war Republic, there was a necessity to coordinate policy
closely in order to maximize the efforts to rebuild the German economic engine that
had been thoroughly destroyed during World War II. The Wirtschqftswunder or
economic miracle of the 1960s and 70s attest to the success of this strategy. But as
the global economy experienced a slow-down with the thawing of the Cold War at the
end of detente and with the beginning of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, the
economic success which, through a sort of fiscal federalism, had "bought" the
cooperation of the Lander in the politikverjlechtung system was threatened. With
only minimal tax powers of their' own, the Lander were left to continue federally
mandated programs with stagnating tax revenues from the federal government. Much
like the crisis of the unfunded mandate in American politics around the same time, the

Lander governments found this to be a difficult problem in maintaining the
constitutionally required equal living conditions.

39 Jeffery, "German Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," 175.
40 Sturm, "The Federal System," 111
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Second, economic success in the first few decades of the Bundesrepublik was
contingent, in large part, upon the negotiating prowess of the federal government and
its ability to forge economic agreements with other countries which would secure
markets for Germany's growing export economy. With the advent of European
economic integration in the 1980s, the importance of federal involvement in
promoting German industry has declined. Especially with the formation of the
European Economic Community, the implementation of the single European market
and the eventual adoption of the Euro as a common currency, the Lander were no
longer dependent on the Bund to help gain access to foreign markets. 41 Consequently,
the Lander have been less willing to accept federal domination in numerous economic
policy areas since they are able to act without aid from the federation within the Eurozone.
Third, the relative social and economic homogeneity which prevailed
throughout the history of the West German federal republic42, and which, perhaps
more importantly, simplified the goal of providing equal living conditions, was
shattered by the accession of the East German Lander into the federation. After the
territory change, as Charlie Jeffery wrote in 2005, "[Germany] has become far more
diverse than it used to be. There is now a mismatch between the form of federalism

41 Stunn, "The Federal System," 111-112.
42 Jens Woelk, "Farewell to the 'unitary federal state'? Transfonnation and tendencies of the Gennan
federal system," in The Changing Faces of Federalism, eds. Sergio Ortino et al. (New York:
Manchester University Press, 2005), 175.
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and the level of diversity of society. " 43 The economic contrast between the rich,
industrialized Lander of West Germany, such as Bavaria or North Rhine-Westphalia
and the poor, rural ones, like Schleswig-Holstein in the north paled in comparison to
vast differences between the same rich Lander and the poorest states of former East
Germany. Furthermore, the citizens of East Germany had lived for half a century
under vastly different social and economic conditions which complicated their
integration into the culture of West German social capitalism. Germans from both
East and West spoke of the "wall in our heads" after reunification, primarily a result
of "the sudden merger of two incompatible political, economic, and social systems
that had developed in the two Germanys between 1945 and 1990."44 This "inner
separation" was often exacerbated by tales of Western German exploitation of cheap
infrastructure and physical capital for quick profit, reminiscent of the Union
"carpetbaggers" of the American post-civil war reconstruction era. 45
Fourth, the political parties of Germany have, since the 1980s, moved away
from a hard and fast nation-wide party line. The growing need for independence of

Land party organizations, emphasized by the increasing frequency in mid-term
elections for citizens of a Land to oust the party for which they voted in the national
election, has already begun to precipitate changes. Ruling Lander coalitions have
increasingly voted in the Bundesrat based on regional interests rather than
43 Jeffery, "Federalism: the New Territorialism," 85.
44 Lewis Edinger and Brigitte Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin: German politics in transition (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998), 14.
45 Ibid., 23.
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coordinating with their party line or other same-party coalition-run Lander.
Ironically, the increasingly frequent call for federalism reform has exacerbated this
change, because the issues at stake in such a discussion cross every conceivable party
line and cause Lander governments to align themselves across new cleavages.
Additionally, the growth of "third parties" and their participation in numerous Land
ruling coalitions has exacerbated differences between party policies at the state and
national levels as more and more often parties in the Lander find themselves aligned
with different coalition partners than their national party organization at the federal
level. 46
It is rather clear that there has been increasing pressure, both from inside and
outside of the political establishment, over the last two decades for reforms of the
federal system. Many of those in favor ofreform would like to see a shift of
responsibilities and areas of competence back to the Lander resulting in increased
autonomy and independence in legislation and policy formulation. These proponents
point at the American model of the states as "laboratories of innovation" as an
example of success with this type of policy competition.
This new fascination with Wettbewerbsflideralismus, or competitive
federalism comes to a great extent as a result of the attempt by richer Lander to
replace coordination and uniformity as national buzzwords with the concept of
subsidiarity. Based on Catholic social thought, the promulgation of this principle,
46 Jeffery, "Federalism: the New Territorialism," 84.
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which argues that social issues and problems are best tackled by the smallest political
institution possible", usually local entities, has unsurprisingly been spearheaded by
the Bavarian government.
The disentanglement of the Land and national political party stages has begun
to alter the political landscape in such a way that will encourage some type of
institutional reform, whether de facto, or through an amendment of the Grundgesetz.
As previously mentioned, there has been an increasing trend for Land voters to oust
the ruling party in midterm Land elections as a result of actions by the party at the
Bund level. There is a growing disconnect between policy action in the federation

and political consequences, as parties in the individual Lander bear the brunt of
voters' dissatisfaction or disenchantment with politics in Berlin.

De facto Federal Reform
While formal institutional change in the shape of constitutional reform has
failed numerous times, and been relatively ineffective when it has succeeded, German
federalism has hardly been static over the past half century. Much like the American
experience, constitutional rigidity has been circumvented by various de facto
institutional changes.
Both the American Constitution and the German Grundgesetz lay out rather
extensive, and purposefully difficult to overcome, processes for undertaking
47 Sturm, "The Federal System," 113.
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constitutional reform. In this respect, in the United States, the federal constitution
stands in stark contrast to those of the states; while the states have held more than 230
conventions, adopted more than 140 separate constitutions and ratified over 6,000
amendments, the federal government has not seen a single constitutional convention
since the founding convention in Philadelphia, and has adopted only twenty-seven
amendments. In the United States, as John Dinan points out, this constitutional
rigidity has led to institutional reform or rather evolution outside of formal processes,
through actions (or inaction in some cases) of Congress, the President, or the
Supreme Court. 48
Perhaps Germany will come to take heart in the American experience,
especially since the German system not only has the constitutional hurdles but also a
preponderance of political hurdles and entrenched interests to overcome. It would
appear, with the decision in 1999 regarding fiscal equalization, among others, that the

Bundesverfassungsgericht may be taking on a reformative role much like the
Supreme Court has done in the United States. Still the extent to which the BVerjG
can assume this sort ofrole is greatly limited by the extensive statutory characteristics
of the Grundgesetz; especially vis-a-vis the American Constitution. 49 The US
Supreme Court has been able to promote judicial federalism primarily because of the
laconic nature of the Constitution which left significant areas of policy up for judicial
48 John Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 2006), 1-2.
49 Edinger and Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin, 48.
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review and interpretation. The Grundgesetz, on the other hand, goes into
considerable detail, and at 146 articles and more than 25,000 words-many times
longer than the Constitution-leaves little room for any considerable judicial
interpretation.

The Possibility of German Federal Reform
A notable point which has become apparent in reviewing the history of
Germany's federal experiences, is the striking similarity between the historical
evolution of federalism and Germany and the public policy model of punctuated
equilibriums. The punctuated equilibriums model posits that political systems go
through cycles of policy activity, with longer periods of relatively stagnant policies
interrupted by short periods of innovative policy-making. 50 In Germany, a similar
case is observed in periods of stability, especially with regard to political system,
punctuated by short periods of upheaval, such as the Thirty-Years War in the early
17th century, the wars of succession in many German states in the mid-1800s, and the
two World Wars in the twentieth century. Specifically, most of the innovations and
changes in German federalism have come as an authoritarian state disintegrated or
was defeated and the rebuilding of a republican democratic system allowed
significant flexibility in federal design. In the past century and a half, these changes
have typically fallen relatively close, within 30 or 40 years of each other, beginning
50 B. Guy Peters, American Public Policy: Promises and Performance (Washington, DC: CQ Press,
2004), 49.
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with the organization ofa federal German Empire in 1871, the founding of the
Weimar Republic in 1919, and then the establishment of the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1948. Now sixty years later, the Bundesrepublik has failed to make any
major reforms to its political system which even remotely resemble the differences
between the German Empire and the Weimar Republic or Weimar and the post-war
Federal Republic. It might be argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
dissolution of the German Democratic Republic offered an opportunity for such
change, but went unrealized because of the choice to incorporate the reestablished
East German Lander into the extant Federal German Republic rather than establish a
new state altogether.
Prior iterations of German democratic federalism never survived long enough
to have to cope with extreme changes in political circumstances. Instead, advances in
federal design were precipitated by changes in the political system which allowed for
innovation and evolution of federalism. At the point of reunification, the pattern of
German federal evolution broke down. Previously, German federalism had been the
result of a practical application of historic regionalism to the political realities of the
day. In the several years surrounding German reunification, political leaders failed to
recognize not only the major changes in political and economic circumstances it had
and would precipitate, but especially the monumental challenge these changes posed
to the fundamental policy goals of relatively equal living standards and uniform
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policy provision across the federation. What has resulted is the stagnation of the
federal evolution in Germany, which has frustrated both political leaders and the
public alike.
The political necessity of fundamental reform in the German federal system
has by now become quite clear. Politikverdrossenheit, the disenchantment with
politics, of the German public has grown to such epic proportion that reform has
become an unavoidable topic in elections at every level of government. As it stands,
cooperative federalism in the German governments has been primarily a procedural
device to facilitate the regional and local provision of nevertheless nationally uniform
policies and social conditions, as well as another institutional manifestation of the
separation of powers. Competitive federalism, on the other hand, is much more of a
theoretical concept under which regional autonomy encourages creativity in policy
making. 51 If the German system is to move in the direction of an American-style
competitive federalism, Sturm argues, a number of fundamental institutional changes
are necessary.
First, the federation must consider the implementation of Neugliederung, the
process of redrawing Lander boundaries. This process has been undertaken
previously in the Bundesrepublik, when, in 1952, the merger ofWiirttembergHohenzollern, Baden, and Wiirttemberg-Baden gave birth to the new southwestern

Land of Baden-Wiirttemberg. The result of this process must be a sort of
51 Sturm, "The Federal System," 114.
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demographic and economic gerrymandering, so that the various Lander are large
enough and have sufficient economic capacity to compete not only with each other,
but also with other regions in the modem, economically integrated European
market. 52
Secondly, the design of the fiscal equalization system must be revisited in an
attempt to increase Lander responsibility for its expenditures. Not only does the
current financial system prevent the Lander from directly financing policy initiatives,
eliminating any meaningful flexibility with regards to policy innovation, it also gives
the Lander the wrong fiscal incentives. Because Lander with above-average income
are required to transfer a significant portion (approximately one third in Bavaria) of
their surplus income to raise poorer Lander to 95% of the national average, these

Lander have little incentive to improve economic performances because they will
reap a disproportionately small benefit. Poor lander, on the other hand, have little
incentive to ensure judicious expenditures or increase economic competitiveness
since improved fiscal outcomes merely reduce the transfers received through
equalization. 53 Certainly the absolute truth of these disincentives are as debatable as
the economic theories on which they are based, but there is no doubt that the current
design of fiscal equalization is incompatible with any efforts to promote policy
competition amongst the lander.

52 Sturm, "The Federal System," 114-115.
53 Sturm, "The Federal System," 117.
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Third, the politikverflechtung of the Lander and the Bund must be reduced so
that both levels operate with more independence from one another. The joint
decision-making which characterizes a majority of policy-making efforts should be
trimmed back to allow more political autonomy for the Lander, whose parliaments
have been increasingly marginalized with the growth of the number of joint tasks and
federal framework legislation in which only the Lander executives have input via the

Bundesrat. Any major step in the direction of disentanglement is hindered by one of
the most stark contrasts between American and German federal systems. Both in the
United States and Germany, there is often discussion of"concurrent powers," those
powers shared between or exercised concurrently by both federal and state
governments. The primary example of concurrent powers in the US is the power of
taxation, one which is conspicuously Jacking in the German Lander. The absence of
any significant taxing powers leaves the German states without any way to generate
revenue from within the state. As a result, even in those policy areas which are still
reserved to the Lander, legislation is constrained by the vertical and horizontal

Finanzausgleich systems by which the federal government transfers tax revenues
from its coffers back to the states and from richer Lander to poorer ones. 54
Finally, related to the previous point, the Lander must work to recapture

Bundesrat as a forum in which their preferences and interests can be asserted. 55 The

54 Edinger and Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin, 54-55.
55 Sturm, "The Federal System," 118.
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Ltinderkammer has, since the inception of the Federal Republic, operated as venue for
the political opposition to veto legislation introduced by the administration since it
often lacks the power to do so in the Bundestag, a point which is emphasized by the
historical increase in the number of vetoes when there are opposing majorities in the
two houses. 56 The gradual expropriation of the Bundestag by party-coalition interests
has only intensified the feeling of politikverdrossenheit, and the related

parteiverdrossenheit, or party disenchantment, among the German public.

It would be foolish to discuss necessary or ideal reform measures in the
German federal system without also assessing the political and institutional feasibility
of such reforms. J.W. Kingdon presented the multiple streams model of public policy
analysis in 1984 to explain why certain issues and problems gain political prominence
and are eventually translated into policy implementations while others become highly
visible but do not result in any policy outputs and some fail even to gain much
attention. Kingdon focusses on three distinct streams: the problem stream, the policy
stream and the politics stream. The problem stream is closely associated with the
public policy process of agenda setting. An issue must be identified as a problem,
specifically one which can be affected by the policy-making process, for there to be
any hope of action. The policy stream is intricately related to issues of policy
innovation and diffusion and is a subtle modification of the earlier rather simplistic
garbage can model, in which policy actors take ready-made policies and search for a
56 Stunn, "The Federal System," 119.
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problem for which the policy may be a solution. Finally, the politics stream focuses
on the rational choice aspects of policy makers as well as other political actors and
institutions and the perceived feasibility and benefits of solving specific problems."
Recent reform attempts

German reunification and all the previously discussed changes in landscape
that resulted from it have had an enormous agenda setting effect by raising the public
awareness of the need for institutional reform. Certainly the frustration of the public
had been growing in the 1980s, but the addition of the economically and socially
different eastern Lander further underscored the inability of the classic German
cooperative federalism and politikverjlechtung to cope with new issues of economic
downturn, globalization and an integrated Europe. Political gridlock following
reunification as well as revelations of corruption and profiteering in East Germany's
former Communist party so deepened the public disenchantment with the political
system thatpolitikverdrossenheitwas named the "word of the year" in 1992 by a
major German newspaper. 58
From 1993 to 1995 a number of small reforms were carried out regarding
fiscal equalization and independence in the Lander. In addition to agreements on
social service maintenance, railroad reform, and housing construction, 59 among other
57 "Streams model," (Metagora) [Web site]; available from <http://www.metagora.org/training/
encyclopedia/streams.html>; accessed on 13 April 2009.
58 Edinger and Nacos, From Bonn to Berlin, 62.
59 "Die Vereinbarung Uber den Solidarpakt" ["The Agreement on the Solidarity Pact"], trans. Thomas
Dunlap, (Archiv der Gegenwart, 1993) [Article online]; available from
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things, the Solidarity Pact of 1993 obtained concessions from the federal government
that it would bear a vast majority of the financial burden of reunification (nearly 90
percent), though some of that would be financed by a 7.5% "solidarity surcharge" on
income and corporate taxes. In exchange for the I 0% contribution of the Lander to
the fiscal solidarity efforts, the portion of VAT revenues received by the states would
go from 35 to 37% in 1993, financed by a rate hike of 1% in January of 1993, and rise

°

again to 44% in 1995.6 Furthermore, the Bundwould shoulder most of the former
East's debt service burden. 61 Although the Solidarity Pact could be seen as a small
victory on the part of the Lander, the media was critical of the lack of true reform
measures or political creativity in approaching the problems of reunification. Instead,
the Zeit accused, the federal government had fallen back on debt spending to finance
development efforts in the east. 62
In 1996, an ambitious plan was introduced to merge the governments of
Berlin and the surrounding Brandenburg, in hopes that the move would precipitate
sweeping neugliederung across the federation. Interestingly enough, the measure had
been approved by the governments of both Lander and was positively received by the
citizens of Berlin. A referendum in Brandenburg on the proposal, though, was
roundly rejected by citizens of the rural Land. This failure stalled any further
<http://gennanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter3 _doc_7_solidarity.pd!>, 1-2, accessed on 13
April 2009.
60 Arthur Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism After Unification," Publius 24, no. 2 (I 994): 85.
61 Ibid, 88.
62 "The Agreement on the Solidarity Pact," 4.
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territorial reform politicians had in mind. The issue continues to be pushed from the
agenda as a new referendum planned for 2006 has now been delayed until 2013. 63
The efforts of fiscal equalization and the Solidarity Pact were stymied by a
1999 decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht which held that the current design of
the fiscal equalization scheme was unconstitutional. The ruling required that the
system be overhauled to make it more transparent and allowed the federal legislature
until 2002 to design new guidelines which would go into effect in 2005. 64 As a result
of the decision, the federal government and Lander negotiated an extension of the
Solidarity Pact, whose initial end date of 2005 would be hampered by equalization
reform, all the way to 2019. 65
The rich western Lander, especially Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttemberg, who
had appealed the fiscal equalization scheme to the BVerfG in the first place, were not
pleased with the idea that monetary transfers to the poor eastern states might continue
for another two decades. As a result, they began calling for institutional reform, and
drumming up popular support from their citizens and as well as other Lander
governments for a more comprehensive statutory overhaul of the po/itikverjlechtung

andjinanzausgleich systems.
In October of 2003, following the March "Declaration ofLiibeck" by a
63 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism and Recent Refonn Efforts," 1287.
64 Arthur Gun!icks, A Major Operation or an Aspirin for a Serious Illness? The Recent Agreement
Between the Federation and the lander on Financing the lander (Washington, DC: American
Institute for Contemporary Gennan Studies, 2001); [Article online] available from
<http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/ at-issue/ai-gunlicks.aspx>
65 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism and Recent Refonn Efforts," 1288-89.
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convention of Lander parliaments establishing the reform of federalism as a priority,
the German houses of parliament inaugurated the Kommission von Bundestag und

Bundesrat zur Modernisierung der bundestaatlichen Ordnung, 66 or KOMBO for short,
charged with the development of reform proposals to increase transparency,
efficiency and more clearly define competencies of the federation and Lander. After a
year of negotiations between the parties, the Lander and the Bund, led by CSU head
and Bavarian Ministerpra~ident Edmund Stoiber and Franz Miintefering, the SPD
faction leader in the Bundestag, the commission collapsed in gridlock over
educational policy. 67
Following the early federal elections called by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
for 2005, the CDU/CSU and SPD were forced to form a grand coalition and elected
Angela Merkel as the new Chancellor. 68 Merkel quickly reiterated her support for
federal reform and promised to resurrect the Federalism Commission and push
through successful reform measures. On June 30'\ 2006, the most comprehensive
reform of the Grundgesetz since its adoption in 1949 was passed by the Bundestag
and Bundesrat. 69 First, the amount of federal legislation to which the Bundesrat could
object was effectively reduced. The new changes in the Grundgesetz, the German

66 In English: the "Commission of the Federal Diet and Federal Council to Modernize the FederalState System," often shortened to simply Federalism Commission.
67 Gunther Hega, "Solving the Gordian Knot: The Federalism Commission and the Reform of the
German Federal System." (Article to be presented at a conference, Western Michigan University,
2007), I 0, 17- I 8.
.
68 Arthur Gunlicks, "German Federalism Reform: Part One," German law Journal 08 (2007): 112.
69 Ibid, 115.

45
government estimated, would reduce by one third the number of laws which would
require Bundesrat approval to come into force. Several years later, the government
claims to have done even better, saying that the number of consent-requiring bills has
dropped from an average anywhere from 50 to 61 percent in the years following the
1969 reforms which increased the politikverjlechtung in the first place, to 29.8
percent of all legislation. 70
The Lander, and especially their prime ministers, were compensated for their
loss of power in the federal legislative process by being given the right to deviate
(from the German abweichen) from federal legislative frameworks regarding
administrative structure and procedures. In cases where this right was given, Lander
would be allowed to pass their own regulations if they so desired. Interestingly
enough, in what would appear to be nod toward the American model of "state
laboratories of innovation" and an acknowledgment of the concepts of policy
diffusion, the reform measure provided that, should a Land choose to deviate from
federal frameworks, the federal regulations will be postponed for another six months
to offer the other Lander an opportunity to adopt their own regulations, whether
similar or not. 71
Even though successful, reform efforts of 2006 and their resultant
70 Deutscher Bundestag, Foderalismusreform und Grundgesetz (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2007),
12-14, my translation; [Government pamphlet]; available at
<http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/ schriftenreihen/downloads/foedreform_download.pdt>
accessed on 20 April 2009.
71 Gunlicks, "German Federalism Reform: Part One," 119.
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constitutional amendments have constituted little more than a trivial victory. For one,
the two most important topics to the reform of intergovernmental relations were not
even approached: fiscal equalization and territorial reorganization. 72 As a result, the
recent reforms of the federal system have done little to change the overall nature of
intergovernmental relations. Instead, the government has achieved what amounts to
little more than political appeasement- a reform for reform's sake - in an attempt to
quell growing public politikverdrossenheit and show that the reformstau can truly be
broken.
Still, future efforts at de jure reform of the German federal structure are likely
to be difficult for several reasons. First, when the German constitution or
Grundgesetz was drafted in the late 1940s, the empirical study of federalism was far

more advanced than it was at the end of the eighteenth century when the American
founding fathers met at the constitutional convention. Federalism was at that time a
rather ephemeral normative concept of governance, not an established and tested
system of government, indeed the name itself was not fully decided on. As a result,
the framers drafted a rather vague constitution that embodied the normative values of
this "federal" governance which they had decided would be most successful in
protecting the rights of citizens and preventing democracy from sliding into tyranny
and was only so specific as to preclude the abuses which had recently been suffered
by the colonies under the rule of King George and to avoid certain pitfalls of weak
72 Ibid, 113
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central government experienced under the short-lived Articles of Confederation.
The modem German constitution, on the other hand, was drawn up after the
American "laboratory of federalism" had been operating for more than a century and
a half. Furthermore, five other developed countries had adopted federal systems in
the interim, including Germany's World War II cohort and neighbor Austria only a
few years earlier in 1945. Because of this fact, the German framers had an abundance
of trial-and-error examples and evidence from a variety of federal approaches to
governance from which they could easily form a combination of the most successful
and most appropriate to the German culture, population, regions, and nation as a
whole. What resulted was the German Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, a "constitution"
much longer, significantly more legislative, and more based in pragmatism than
political ideals than the American Constitution.
The Grundgesetz leaves much less room for extraconstitutional reform and
other de facto changes, since it enumerates far more about the operation of
government and the dynamics of intergovernmental relations that the American
Constitution. Instead, any major evolutions in government are likely to require
statutory empowerment, a task which is difficult. Granted, the significant
constitutional hurdles which hinder the amendment of the Grundgesetz have been
overcome a number of times, but Germany's institutional design poses certain
problems which stymie any efforts to form the necessary coalition of interests to
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overcome the constitutional rigidity of the reform process when it comes specifically
to issues of federal design and intergovernmental relations.
There is an underlying "thesis" to any reform efforts in the last decade: a
move toward "competitive federalism" under which the entanglement of federal and
state government will be trimmed, reducing the scope of concurrent policy areas by
designating some specifically to the federal sphere and others exclusively to the

Lander. To make any progress in this respect requires a great deal of compromise as
to the specific policy areas which will be disentangled and, furthermore, which level
of government will be excluded from what policy areas. This compromise calls for
concessions to be made by both the federal government and the Lander.
Unfortunately, the design of the federal system poses another problem which causes
infighting within the Lander. Because concurrent powers are exercised by the Lander
at the federal level via the Bundesrat, the Lander executives, who appoint the
members of their Land's Bundesrat caucus, exercise significant influence in these
areas. If and when those powers are removed, the Lander executives stand to lose
much of their influence either way. If a policy area is reserved to the federal
government by reform measures, the Lander, and by extension their executives will
lose any influence in that area. If, on the other hand, a policy area is reserved to the
Land governments, power over it will be exercised by the state diets, or Landtage, in
which the Land executives have ironically less influence than they do in the

49
Bundesrat. As a result, personal interest and ambition of Lander executives

controvert the disentanglement sought by the proponents of competitive federalism.
In fact, there are many examples in recent history where politicians have used the
post of Ministerprasident as a sort of springboard to higher federal offices. 73
Even if only a perfunctory version of the German goal of uniform social
provision is to be maintained, measures will have to be undertaken first to
compensate for some glaring demographic heterogeneity between the Lander. There
are several ways to do this, but, once again, there seems to be insurmountable
political opposition in each direction. The first of these options is the ever-divisive
fiscal equalization process. The citizens of the new Lander continue to earn
significantly lower wages than their counterparts in former West Germany, and while
their wages are growing more quickly, the growth rate difference (0.3%) is so small
and the current annual difference of more than Euro I 0,000 is so large, that, at current
growth rates, average wages will continue to diverge. 74 Lower earning rates in the
eastern Lander result in lower tax revenue for the administration, making provision of
73 Matthias Geis, "Jeder fllr sich, keiner fllr alle" ["Everyone for themselves, no one for the people"],
trans. Erik Weber and Richard Weber, Die Zeit, 22 December 2004, [Magazine archive online]
available from <http://www.zeit.de/2004/53/Scheitem>; accessed 9 April 2009.
74 "Bruttoverdienste (Gross earnings)" Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, my translation, [web
site] available from <http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Intemet/DE/Navigation/
Statistiken/ VerdiensteArbeitskosten/Bruttoverdienste/Bruttoverdienste.psml>; accessed 13 April 2009.
The data of the German Federal Statistical Office is average gross monthly earnings in the 4~ quarter
of2008 for all of Germany, and also divided by gender, and by former East and West German Lander.
It should be noted that the earnings reported are without Sonderzahlungen, or bonuses, so I suspect
that, with a preponderance of service and financial sector jobs concentrated in former West German
Lander, the real earnings difference is actually greater than conveyed by these statistics. Granted, the
cost of living in the eastern Lander is, on average, lower than in the West but likely not so much lower
as to ameliorate the lower income levels.
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public services difficult and reinforcing the relative poverty of states with higher rates
of welfare recipients, such as unemployment, to begin with. Fiscal equalization
measures seek to provide these poorer states with surplus revenue with which to
institute economic development programs such as job training, factory retooling,
continuing education, and infrastructure improvements, which will help raise the
economic competitiveness of these states to the level of the richer Lander more
quickly than may otherwise have happened.
The other option to improve the chances of achieving equivalent standards of
living and economic competitiveness. across the Lander is to redraw the boundaries of
some smaller and poorer states. This solution is based on a simple argument of
administrative efficiency. The basic tenet is that administrative overhead in
government dictates that the cost of governing is not directly proportional to the
number of people governed. Because all districts, no matter how small require
certain administrative offices, employees, services, etc., the larger an administrative
division is, the cheaper it is, per capita, to run. If this concept is applied to the
German Lander, there are significant conceivable savings to be reaped. Consider
North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's most populous state: with just over 18 million
citizens, it is more populous than the entire former East German territory, and has
only about 500,000 inhabitants as the nine smallest Lander combined. Certainly the
new Lander could stand to benefit from the process of neugliederung, considering
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that a combined Saxony-Thuringia-Saxony Anhalt state would have slightly more
inhabitants than Lower Saxony in the west, making it still only the fourth largest
state. The benefits are not limited to the east, though - combining Saarland with
neighboring Rhineland-Palatinate, eliminating by far the smallest Flachenland and
second least populated Land, results in a moderately sized Bundesland both in terms
of size and area. Unfortunately, the longer the German federal system continues in its
current incarnation, the more difficult it will be to redraw any Land boundaries. The
first and only time a neugliederung proposal has been successful was less than a
decade after the end of World War II, when three southwestern states joined to form
Baden-Wurttemberg in 1952. Since then, no more attempts in the west have been
made and the proposed merger of Berlin and Brandenburg in 1996 was turned down
by the voters.
Thus we have identified a major challenge in the problem stream: there are
many poor Lander with small and relatively poor populations and too little area or
natural resources to foster competitive economic growth and maintain healthy
industries. We have also discussed two possible solutions in the policy stream: fiscal
equalization, or neugliederung. We must now determine whether the politics stream
will converge with the other two streams at one of these two intersections. The
conclusion is less than encouraging. While the current system of fiscal equalization
will remain in place for another decade, it is inconceivable that the richer states will
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allow the program to be renewed for any longer without major concessions.
Unfortunately these concessions, such as the right to opt-out of certain portions of the
fiscal equalization programs, will likely only harm the long term goal of nationwide
regional competitiveness. The discussion of alternatives to the current design of
fiscal equalization also raises serious questions about the convergence of the politics
stream. The five Lander who are net payers into the equalization system75 possess 26
votes in the Bundesrat 76 , enough to veto any proposed extension of the fiscal
equalization, while the poorest receiving Lander still have enough votes to veto
legislation in Bundesrat even if several Lander who are only marginal beneficiaries of
equalization join the rich states.
A convergence of the political stream at the neugliederung crux, despite more
readily tangible benefits of the policy, is probably less likely than a continuation or
reform of equalization. Keeping in mind that the former East German Lander were
conceived in the late 1940s only to be eliminated in the GDR, even the Lander which
had the least connection with any sort of historical region have now existed over half
a century, giving them plenty of time to develop their own regional identities which

75 Deutscher Bundesrat, "Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfiihrung des Finanzausgleichs-gesetzes im
Ausgleichsjahr 2007," 3, my translation [Government publication] (Berlin: Deutscher Bundesrat,
2008), available from <http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_4480/DE/
Wirtschaft_ und_ Verwaltung/ Finanz_und_ Wirtschaftspolitik/Foederale_Finanzbeziehungen/
Laenderfinanzausgleich/Endg_C3_ BCltige_ 20Abrechnung_20LFA_ 202007,templateld=raw,proper
ty=publicationFile.pdt>; accessed 21 April 2009.
76 Deutscher Bundesrat, "Bundesrat Stimmenverteilung im Bundesrat," my translation [Web site]
(Berlin: Detuscher Bundesrat, 2009); available from <http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_099/nn_8328/
DE/struktur/stimmenverteilung/stimmenverteilung-node.htrnl>; accessed 21 April 2009.
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will be difficult to eliminate. Furthermore, given the tendency of administrative selfpreservation, it is difficult to imagine the governments of any Lander to be combined
approving a measure which would greatly reduce their political influence and
possibly even eliminate their positions altogether.
Lander have historically been divided into several administrative regions now
uniformly called Regierungsbezirke, which are themselves divided into a smaller
subdivisions, either classified as Landkreise, state districts something like the
administrative counties found in numerous American states, or Kreisfreie Stadte,
district-free cities which constitute their own administrative unit. Interestingly
enough three of the sixteen Lander, beginning with Rhineland-Palatinate in 2000,
followed by Saxony-Anhalt in 2004, and Lower Saxony in 2005, have recently
disbanded their Regierungsbezirke. 11 Lower Saxony specifically cited the reduction
of personnel costs as the primary reason for this reform, estimating that 6,700
positions could be cut by eliminating the three-tiered administrative structure of the
state, the savings from which would ostensibly allow the Land to balance its budget
within five years. 78 While the savings figures were criticized as overstated, still, two
points can be taken from this example and others. First, the Lander, lacking any
independent power of taxation, must work within the confines of externally
77 Jfirg Bogumil and Steffen Kottmann, "Verwaltungsstrukturreform - die Abschaffung der
Bezirksregierungen in Niedersachsen" in Schriflenreihe der Stiflung Westfalen-lniliative Band 11,
(MUnster: IbbenbUrener Vereinsdruckerei GmbH, 2006), my translation [Journal online] available from
<http://verwaltungsinnovation-nrw.de/papers/Gutachten-N iedersachsen-2006.pdt>; accessed 13 April
2009.
78 Ibid
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determined revenue, which leads to creative savings methods, such as the reduction of
administrative divisions in this case. Second, Lander are undertaking their own form
of neugliederung to improve efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery and to
cut costs of administration. Perhaps if these efforts are shown in the future to have
been successful in their intentions, this will bolster the case for reducing the number
of administrative divisions at the federal level through several mergers of current

Lander.

Prognosis for the future
Although [Wolfgang Rensch] agrees with Jeffery's perception of an increasing
disentanglement of German federalism, if not formally, then at least de facto,
[he] argues that German federalism still qualifies as largely cooperative:
hardly any federation goes as far as the German one when it comes to
centralizing legislative but decentralizing executive authority. 79
Despite all the public dissatisfaction with and resultant political animosity
toward the cooperative prerogatives of the federal and state governments in Germany,
reform attempts have been largely unsuccessful in precipitating any significant
changes in the central legislative authority of the Bund. This stagnation can be
attributed to, and is, to the frustration of the German public, likely to continue
because of a preponderance of conflicting interests which seem to thwart major
attempts at intergovernmental reform in Germany.
The design of the Bundesrat representation produces an inherent conflict of
79 Umbach, "Introduction," 10.
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interest in any attempt to reduce the importance of Bundesrat consent in federal lawand policy-making. Representation of the Lander by members of their executive
complicates the politics of reform by introducing personal interests which may cause
the rational choice decisions of Bundesrat members to diverge from rational choices
of best interest to the institutions they represent. Barring an unlikely majority of
altruistic Ministerprasidenten and other Land cabinet members, with no political
aspirations of their own, it is difficult to conceive of the Lander executives voting to
diminish their own political power at the federal level, especially if the result is to
cede it back to their colleagues, and often political opponents, in the Landrat.
Both solace and alarm can be taken at the distinct possibility that changes will
have to be undertaken out of necessity at some point in the relatively near future.
Much like small and inefficient companies find it difficult to survive in competition
with larger, more streamlined businesses, smaller, poor Lander will find themselves
in increasingly difficult economic situations, especially if, as the politics stream
seems to indicate will happen, the Finanzausgleich system is allowed to expire or
renewed only with major concessions. The result will be the eventual political and
economic necessity of neug/iederung, just as small businesses merge or a bought up
by other companies looking to increase efficiency and cut costs.

German Federalism in a Europe of the Regions
Framed in a European setting, "federalism" raises a wide variety of reactions
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from Europeans. Since the 1980s, federalism has been associated across the continent
with the gradual relinquishing of state sovereignty to a pan-European amalgam of
supranational political institutions. The American post-war globalization experience
has been quite differently framed, especially since the most demanding global
institution it has joined, the UN, has nowhere near the requirements that the European
Union does. Furthermore, from a semantic perspective, the term federalism has
rarely been attached to such supranational bodies in American discourse.
An increasingly integrated Europe raises new challenges for a slowly evolving
German federal system. Similar to the American experience of the states' creative
involvement in international trade and economic development before Congress can
legislate, it seems that the Lander have used their degree of influence at the federal
level by giving or withholding consent in the Bundesrat as bargaining chip to gain
access to the European policy-making forum before the Bund can get its proverbial
ducks in a row. As Germany, being one of the strongest proponents of a united
Europe, projects its Federal"history and institutional preference on to the European
Union, the effects come full circle. In the 80s and 90s, the Lander found themselves
somewhat endangered as the European Union took shape and more and more national
sovereignty was transferred to Brussels. The Lander watched as a number of the
powers transferred by the federal government to the EU came from traditional Lander
competencies. So the Lander have gone back to the German government demanding
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restitution for their loss in power. The Lander have been willing to concede some
policy areas previously reserved to them to the European Parliament via the federal
government in exchange for increased influence in the European Council of
Ministers. While this would seem on the surface to weaken the Lander in the larger
scheme, it may, in actuality be a very judicious political power play. If the Lander
perceive the fight for more legislative responsibility within Germany as lost to the
federal government, they may feel that the European Union offers a new "theater" in
which to continue this battle. Suppose the Lander have conceded the fight to wrest
policy-making freedom from the federal government as an unending battle of
conflicting interests, political gridlock, and hopelessly entangled policy areas, then
the nascent European forum offers them an opportunity to gain influence vis-a-vis the
federation. Within Germany, the Lander independence is limited by the federation,
resulting in a inherent disadvantage when fighting for policy-making powers. In the
European Union, on the other hand, the Federation, as well as the Lander are subject
to limits placed on them by the supranational legislative body. Furthermore, the
inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty means that a more
powerful European Union may very well translate to increased policy-making
independence in the Lander at the expense of the federal government. Some
observers have even argued that, of the three levels of government in modem
European politics, the national level is likely to "atrophy" first. 80 If the principle of
80 Gunlicks, "Gennan Federalism After Unification," 98.
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subsidiarity continues to underpin a "Europe of the Regions," as countries relinquish
more and more sovereignty to the EU, the regions stand to regain some of their
sovereignty under the guise of policy making prerogatives.
The twenty years since reunification have produced unsatisfactory results
from the current systems of politikverjlechtung andfinanzausgleich. Thus, whether
through the subsidiarity of the European Union or gradual movement towards more
competitive federalism at home, the Lander are in desperate need of an infusion of
responsibility, government wide, as opposed to the current concentration of influence
and responsibility in the veto-wielding Lander executives. The unified marketslabor, currency and goods-of the European Union demand creative policy-making
approaches to problems new and old. The American states have adapted to similar
conditions under free-trade agreements such as NAFTA, implementing local incentive
packages to attract domestic and foreign investment. It is high time the
Bundesrepublik gave the Lander an opportunity to attempt similar policy measures.

Conclusion
In the American experience, the term Federalism very much embodies a
theoretical political ideology in Skocpol's sense. To adhere to federalism was to
believe in the virtues of separate spheres of power as a protection against tyranny.
Furthermore, federalism is, in the collective American mind, a unique American
invention, emphasized by the demi-god status which the Founders have achieved in
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both political and popular discourse.
Quite on the contrary, German Foderalismus has, throughout history, been a
rather practical manifestation. Federalism in Germany is a function of unique
historical regionalism applied to political circumstances at various times throughout
history. The result has been a "pragmatic federalism" informed more by policy goals
than by political ideals. As the validity of these policy goals is challenged, so too is
the federal design.
While there are a number of differences in the federal experience of the
United States and that of German history, one similarity stands out when assessing the
future course of federalism in each country. Much like the American discourse about
"new federalism" versus "creative federalism" or "new nationalism," there is a
general disagreement, it seems, among German political scholars and observers as to
the status of German federalism as well as the best or most likely path for the future.
As the argument between classical cooperative federalism and new competitive
federalism continues to grow, what becomes more apparent is the conflict of ideas
behind these two designs. It emphasizes the growing contentiousness of, and waning
desire for common standards ofliving and policy provision across the federation, the
goal which has underpinned cooperative federalism of the previous half-century. This
consensus-seeking and uniformity is being challenged by the ideas of autonomy,
differentiation and subsidiarity which have fueled the appeal of competitive
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federalism. 81
What is clear is that the American and (modem) German forms of federalism
began on seemingly opposite ends of a theoretical spectrum of federalism, and have,
over the course of their respective histories, grown closer. The American design
began with very distinct spheres of power for the federal and state governments,
cautiously reserving powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government to the
states or the people; there was an emphatic protection of an independent state role in
government. The German Grundgesetz, on the other hand, designed a thoroughly
intertwined system of powers and intergovernmental relations between the Bund and
the Lander, in which the states retained little independence and were primarily
politically relevant only insofar as the role they played in law-making at the federal
level.
While the American system has experienced increasing centralization of
legislative powers in the federal government, primarily under the auspices of
Supreme Court decisions protecting federal powers of commerce and foreign affairs,
the result is an increasing interdependence and complexity of intergovernmental
affairs. From the other side of the spectrum, the German federal system has, albeit
slowly, begun to disentangle its complex system of intergovernmental cooperation,
often citing the American system as an example of successful implementation of more
politically independent states. What results and where this thesis concludes is that
81 Jeffery, "Gennan Federalism from Cooperation to Competition," 183.
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there is an increasing need for, and usefulness of in-depth comparisons of the two
systems. Perhaps lessons can be learned on both sides of the Atlantic if the Germans
share their pragmatism in exchange for an infusion of American "separate spheres"
federal ideology.

Appendix A- Glossary of German terms and, where applicable, their
American equivalents
(Bundes)Land!Lander-the (sixteen) immediate subdivisions of the Federal Republic
of Germany; comparable in function and status to the American states.
Bund - a term generally used to refer to the federal government as opposed to a Land
government.
Bundesrat- literally "Federal Council"; the second house of German parliament in
which each Land is represented by members of its executive, and may cast
between 3 and 6 votes depending on population; while many compare it to the
Senate, it does not function as an upper house, and therefore comparisons should
be made with caution
Bundestag- literally "Federal Diet"; the main house of German parliament in which
members are either elected to district-based single seats or appointed by a political
party based on a proportional representation scheme; similarities with the House of
Representatives are much more apparent than between the Bundesrat and Senate,
though comparisons with other parliamentary system legislatures, e.g. Britain's
House of Commons, might be more appropriate
Finanzausgleich - the general term for fiscal equalization schemes. The transfer of
surplus tax revenue from richer to poorer Lander is often more specifically
referred to as Landerjinanzausgleich
Fodera/ism us - the german term translated as "federalism"
Grundgesetz - the German "Basic Law" which secures right and freedoms of citizens
and establishes the form of government; comparable to US Constitution.
Kooperativer Foderalismus - a term in German federalism literature which translates
literally to cooperative federalism
Landtag- the general term for the unicameral legislatures of the Lander
Neugliederung- territorial consolidation, reorganization or redrawing of boundaries
Politikverjlechtung- entanglement of federal and state responsibility in certain policy
areas; similar to Laurence O'Toole's "interdependence" discussed in American
Intergovernmental Relations
Politikverdrossenheit - public disenchantment with politics
Wettbewerbsfederalismus - a term in the German federalism literature which is
analogous to the English term competitive federalism
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